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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OTHE.LLO HICKMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

7303

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
·STATEMENT OF

c·~sE

This action was filed in the Third Judicial District
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah by the plaintiff, a resident
of Cache County, Utah, seeking to recover damages from
the defendant as a result of injuries sustained by him when
he drove his 1941 Buick Sedan automobile into the side of
one of defendant's freight trains, specifically a beet car,
which was being backed across Highway 91 about two miles
southwest from Logan in Cache 'County, Utah.
At the conclusion of the evidence and after both parties
had rested, the defendant made a motion to the court requesting an order directing the jury to return a verdict in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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favor of the defendant, no cause of action. The motion for
. directed verdict was denied by the court and the rna tter submitted to the jury which returned a general verdict in favor
of the .defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.
From the judgment on that verdict the plaintiff has appealed.

The statement of the facts recited by appellant in his
brief -is in the main correct, but in some instances the appellant has misstated certain facts and .in a great many instances in giving the facts appellant-.has. not stated the complete facts with respect to various subjects but has stated
only portions of the testimony favorable to appellant or as
given by appellant himself or one or two of his witnesses,
and has ignored or disregarded other competent testimony
by which the jury could have found. the __ facts to be much·
different than as stated by appellant in his brief. For that
reason respondent will in this statement of facts include
some ·measure of argument and point out some additional
· facts or points where the facts differ from those as stated
·by the p.Jaintiff.
. At the outset, we must remind the appellant that the
entire facts in the case must be considered and not just those
that may be favorable to plaintiff, and not just those which
plaintiff or his witnesses may have testified to. The jury is
and was at liberty to believe testimony given by defendant's
witnesses ·just as much as it was at liberty to believe plaintiffrs -witnesses. Also, the jury was entitled to receive in_:· lstruction with respect to evidence submitted by defendant
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and testified to by defendant's witnesses even though that~
testimony may have been in conflict with and contrary to
that which plaintiff himself or his witnesses may have testified to.

.1

The accident occurred on October 30, 19,47 at 6:5S P.M.
(Tr. 167) on U. S. Highway 91, at a point approximately
two miles southwesterly from Logan. The highway at the·
point of the accident runs in a general northeasterly-southwesterly direction, and the defendant's spur track crosses
the highway at grade at approximately right angles (Tr.
112). The highway is level and paved with concrete 22 feet _
in width. In addition to the concrete there is a shoulder on
each side, and in the vicinity of the accident this slioulder .:
is eight feet wide on each side of the concrete (Tr. 112). The
highway runs straight for over a mile in each direction from
the crossing. There is a railroad crossbuck sign on each side
of the railroad track, said crossbuck sign being in each_ instance on the righhand side of the highway and the near
side of the track for approaching highway traffic. There
is no flasher light or other protection at the crossing except the two crossbuck signs (See Exhibit 2).
Appellant states that the track was not in regular use,
but that is contrary. to other testimony, the evidence being
that the track was used throughout the year in the shipping
of lime rock to and from the beet dump, and that during the
beet season there was movement every day (Tr. 381) . The
accident occurred during the beet season and the beet switching movement involved was one where the railroad company
was switching eight empty beet cars in for loading ,sug~r
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beets at the beet dump nearby. The plaintiff was. well acquainted with the crossing and its location.
The plaintiff with Melvin Squires, his partner in business, was traveling along this highway toward Logan, and
approximately three-tenths of a mile before reaching the
spur track they passed a highway patrolman's car facing
the opposite direction. The plaintiff testified that upon passing the highway patrolman he looked at his speedometer and
it "showed just short of 50 miles an hour" (Tr. 228). Defendant's witness T'urley, who was located on the train in
such a position that he saw a broadside view of the approach
of plaintiff's car, stated that plaintiff was going 60 miles
an hour ( T'r. 378). At any rate, as plaintiff passed the highway patrolman he watched in his rear vision mirror and
saw that the officer turned to follow him (Tr. 2,81, 282).
Whether it was because plaintiff was watching the officer's
car in his rear vision mirror or otherwise, plaintiff did not
see defendant's train entering upon the highway as soon
as his passenger did. The passenger, Mr. Squires, first saw
the train out in the field and then in the highway and said
to plaintiff: "There is a train" (Tr. 305, 306). The plaintiff did not see the train until after Squires yelled to him:
"There is a train coming on the highway!" (T'r. 284). The
plaintiff testified that "this car was about half-way into
my lane of traffic, or a little more, when I first observed it."
·Jn other words, the freight car had proceeded more than
half the distance over the 11 feet of the right half of the
pavement before plaintiff saw it and had come over the 8 foot
shoulder of the road and was about six feet onto the pavement at the time Squires called plaintiff'·s attention to it

(Tr. 324).
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After plaintiff put on his brakes, all four wheels skidded
for a distance of 85 feet before his car collided with the
train (Tr. 163) (Exhibit C). The plaintiff did not turn
his car to either the right or the left but drove straight
into the freight car and struck the freight car eight feet
back from the forward end of the car in the direction it was
moving (Tr. 336). The railroad car traveled 10 feet after
the impact and in said 10 feet was brought to a complete
stop (Tr. 3·37), and at the time the freight car came to such
complete stop it had extended over and "was stopped just
a little off the pavement, to the north" ( Tr. 202. See also
Exhibit B).
I

At the time plaintiff's automobile was approaching the
crossing going to\vard Logan, one l\1rs. Afton Archibald of
Wellsville was driving her automobile in the opposite direction coming from Logan. She also stated that she· was going
about 50 miles an hour (Tr. 208). At the time the two automobiles were approaching the crossing, defendant's rear
brakeman, or flagman, Frank E. Belnap, was on the highway at the crossing waving a light attempting to warn approaching traffic (Tr. 359). Mrs. Archibald saw brakeman
Belnap's light when she was over 500 feet away and said
that it appeared to be a flashlight waving up and down, and
she "imagined" that he was waving it up and down in front
of him (T'r. 188, 189'). Mrs. Archibald did not see the outline
of Belnap's body until the lights of the plaintiff's car shone
on him (T'r. 19'7), but she had seen his flashlight before that
time. The plaintiff never did see the brakeman or his light,
although Mr. Squires, who was plaintiff's passenger, saw
the brakeman just shortly before the impact (Tr. 306).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant at page 3 of his brief states that this flagman Belnap was standing on the west side of the pavement
"facing" in the direction of Mrs. Archibald. That is not a
correct statement of the facts in the record. The plaintiff's
evidence does not show what direction Belnap was facing.
Belnap testified he was watching plaintiff's car approach
and attempting to flag it down. Even in her statement that
Belnap was swinging the light up and down Mrs. Archibald
stated she just "imagined" that it was in front of him (Tr.
189) ; then at one place she state&, "the fellow with the flashlight turned in my direction" (Tr. 190) ; and upon counsel's
trying to get her to be more specific, inferring that she
could see him facing her, counsel asked: "You say he turned
from your direction and ran across the spur track, to the
south side of the spur track," and her only answer was: "He
ran toward the car coming from the other direction.. " Even
when she turned off the highway her lights did not enable
her to see directly which way the brakeman was facing because as she turned off the road he was running toward the
other car and "he had moved" (Tr. 200, 201) . The only
-time she observed him sufficiently to even tell that it was
the form of a man at the side of the road was about the
time that she heard the screechin~ of the brakes of plaintiff's car, at which time she was approximately 40 feet from
the track, and as she turned off the road the brakeman ran
toward the other car (Tr. 198, 200, 2:01).
Mrs. Archibald had seen plaintiff's car coming from the
opposite direction when she was over 500 feet from the spur
track (Tr. 189, 190). Plaintiff saw Mrs. Archibald's car approaching, but its lights were not extra bright. The plain,;
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tiff dimmed the lights on his automobile either before or
just at the time he passed the policeman's car and then left
them on dim from there on (Tr. 282). With his lights on
dim plaintiff could see an object in front of him on the highway only 75 or 100 feet (Tr. 285) ; nevertheless, he continued to drive at a speed "just short of 50 miles an hour" and
did not slow down at all until Mr. Squires yelled, "There
is a train" (Tr. 286).
On page 4 counsel states that at the time of the impact
the railroad car was not half-way across the concrete pavement. Mrs. Archibald did so testify, but there is other competent evidence in the record from which the jury could
believe that Mrs. Archibald was mistaken. Mr. Hickman
testified that the freight car was more than half-way on his
side of the pavement when he first saw it. The Hickman
car struck the freight car eight feet from the end thereof.
The freight car traveled only 10 feet after the impact before
it came to rest (Tr. 337), and when it came to rest it had
covered the other half of the highway completely and was
just off the northwest edge of the highway (Tr. 202. See
Exhibit B).
Plaintiff repeats several times that it was a dark night
and the moon had not come up. It is true that officer Reese
so testified, but here again plaintiff disregards other competent evidence which the jury was entitled to believe. The
conductor testified that the moon was shining bright at the
time of the accident (T·r. 349). Rear brakeman Belnap testi- ·
fied the same (Tr. 36.3), as did also head brakeman Turley
(Tr. 378). A United States Weather Bureau Report, which
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was introduced as Exhibit 9, giving the weather at Logan,
Utah, certified that the moon rose there at 6:07P.M. From
5, :00 to 6 :00 the sky was partly cloudy-not over 50 per cent.
Betv1een 6 :00 and 7 :00 this 50 per cent cloudiness was clearing up, and from 7:00 to 8:00 P. M. the sky was entirely
clear. Thus, with the sky entirely clear by 7:00P.M., there
could be very few clouds in the sky five minutes earlier
when the accident happened, the accident happening at 6 :55
(Tr. 167), and at 6:55, the time of the accident, in addition
to the sky's being clear, the moon had been up for 48 minutes,
and the moon rising at that time in the evening would be
practically, if not absolutely, a full moon. At any rate, it
was sufficient that plaintiff's passenger Squires was able
to see the cars of the train out through the field as well as
on the highway (Tr. 305).
The defendant's train crew had already made some
switching movement over and back across this highway taking some loaded cars out, and was at the time switching some
empty cars back into the beet dump for the next day's loading. As they approached the highway they brought the
train to a co1nplete stop right at the edge of a canal bridge
at the southeast edge of the highway, stopping the train
before crossing the bridge (Tr. 35~6). 'The brakeman walked
to the center of the highway, let two cars pass, and at the
time he gave the engineer a signal to proceed across the
highway, there was no car in sight in either direction except a highway patrolman's car which was. southwest of
the crossing upwards of half a mile, facing toward Wellsville away from the crossing (Tr. 368-370). The brakeman
gave the engineer a signal and the engineer started the
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train slowly across the highway. By measurement on the
map, Exhibit 1, it will be seen that it is approximately 60
feet from the south edge of this canal bridge to the ·center
of the highway. Exhibit S. shows the bridge very definitely
and the approach from that bridge to the highway. At the
moment of impact the train was not proceeding faster than
two miles an :p_our (Tr. 352, 3H7). Mrs. Archibald, plaintiff's own witness, testif~ed that when she saw the freight
car moving over the highway it was just barely creeping
along (Tr. 207). The plaintiff Hickman testified that when
his lights were on bright or high beam they would show the
full width of the road from fence. to fence. In other words,
had he had his lights on high beam he would have been able
to see not only the telephone poles shown at the righthand
side of the road in the picture, Exhibit 2, but would have
been able to see the bridges across the canal and the full
width of the road right of way from fence to fence (Tr.
294).

At the outset, we wish to call to the attention of the
court and counsel the rule that on such an appeal as this,
where a matter has been submitted to a jury, the verdict of
the jury must be sustained if there is any competent evidence in the record to sustain it, and in order to find that
evidence we are not bound to take-.as plaintiff and appellant has done-merely evidence favorable to plaintiff or produced by his witnesses, but must take all of the evidence
whether from plaintiff's witnesses on either direct or crossexamination, or from defendant's witnesses on direct or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cross-examination, or from other testimony, including photographs· and other evidence such as the map, Exhibit 1, and
the weather report, Exhibit 9. The rule is rather uniformly
and universally recognized and is well stated in the case of
Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P. 2d 183, 184, where
the c·alifornia Appellant Court stated:
"In reviewing the evidence on such an appeal,
all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences
indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an
elementary, but often overlooked, principle of law,
that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported,
the power of the appellate court begins and ends with
a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
will support the conclusion reached by the jury.
When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without
power to substitute its deductions for those of the
trial court.''
The following cases confirm the application of the foregoing rule within the State of Utah:

Horsley v. Robinson, .. Utah .. , 186 P'. 2d 5-92·.
Ercanbrack v. Ellis'On, lOS. Utah 138, 134 P. 2d
177.

Jensen v. Logan City, 96, Utah 53, 83. P. 2d 311.
Lym v. Thompson, .. Utah .. , 184 P. 2d 66.7.
Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 106 Utah
1

289, 147 P. 2d 875.
Appellant uses a considerable portion of his brief arguing with respect to what the defendant should have done
under its common law duty and whether it should have put
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out flares or other lights. He overlooks the fact that even
if it had been determined that the defendant was negligent,
still the jury may have determined that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence and may have held as they
did on that account. We have no way of knowing now
whether the jury determined that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent or whether the jury concluded that
plaintiff alone was negligent., The appellant in his brief
did not say very much upon the question as to whether or
not the facts in the record would sustain a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, even on
the basis of an assumption that defendant was negligent.
In examining the evidence in this case to see if there
is any substantial competent evidence to sustain the jury's
verdict, there are a few definite physical facts which, when
applied to other evidence, compel the unescapable conclusion
that regardless of whether or not the defendant was negligent in any respect, the plaintiff was nevertheless guilty of
contributory negligen~e.
The Utah statutes in force at the time of this accident
provided:
"57-7-113. Restrictions as to Speed-Reasonable
Under Conditions-Maximums.
"(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then existing. In every
event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or
other conveyance on or entering the high,vay in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all
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persons to use due care.
"* * *
" (c) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent
with the requirements of subdivision (a) of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed when ap.
proaching and crossing an inters.ection or railway
grade crossing, when approaching and going around
a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when
special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or
other traffic or by reason of weather or highway
conditions."
These provisions of statute apply whether the vehicle
is being opera ted in the daytime or the nighttime, and by
such statute a driver who is approaching a railway grade
crossing is put in the same class as one approaching an intersection or one approaching and going around a curve
or a hill crest, and in spite of the State maximum speed
limits, the law requires such a d:river to drive at "an appropriate reduced speed" at such times and places.
Section 57-7-179-, Utah Code Annotated, 1943·, sets forth
lighting equipment required on vehicles on the highway "at
any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before
sunrise." In the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways when it wa~ enacted in 19'41, this section with respect
to lights after sunset and before sunrise was designated as
Section 102.. Section 57-7-197, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
referring thereto, provides in part:
" (a) Whenever a motor vehicle is being operated on a roadway or shoulder adjacent thereto during the time specified in Section 102, the driver shall
use a distribution of light, or composite beam, directed high enough and of sufficient intensity to
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reveal persons and. vehicles at a safe distance in advance of the vehicle, subject to the following requireInent and limitations :"
Then follows the provision that when a vehicle approaches within 500 feet of another vehicle, the lights should
be _dimmed by the driver.
In the case at bar the plaintiff Hickman testified that
·when he passed the highway patrolman, who was at least
three-tenths of a mile from the crossing in question-or
something in excess of 1500 feet-he dimmed his lights. He
continued to drive toward the crossing without reducing
his speed in any manner whatsoever, and according to his
testimony, he continued just under the limit of 50 miles an
hour (Tr. 282, 286). He had seen Mrs. Archibald's car
coming, and she was at least as far away from the crossing
as he was at the time he passed the officer because both
were going at about the same rate 0f speed and Mrs. Archibald slowed down and brought her car to a stop on the opposite side of the crossing just prior to the impact. Therefore,
at the time plaintiff dimmed his lights Mrs. Archibald was
at least 1500 feet or more beyond the crossing-or in other
\Vords, there was something in excess of 3000 feet separating the two automobiles-and Mr. Hickman testified that
the lights of Mrs. Archibald's car were not extra bright (T'r.
282).

The statute above quoted, Section 57-7-197, requires the
operator of a motor vehicle to "use a distribution of light,
or composite beam, directed high enough and of sufficient
intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a safe distance
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in advance of the vehicle * * *" The only exception
authorizes and requires the driver to use the low beam or
dimmer when within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. Had
the plaintiff been maintaining a proper lookout ahead instead
of continuing at his fast rate of speed while observing in the
rear view mirror to see if the officer was following him, and
had he used the high beam or bright lights on his carinasmuch as he continued at the high rate of speed, he would
have been able to see anything on the road ahead of him for
"the full width of the road from fence to fence" (Tr. 294),
and we must assume in absence of evidence to the contrary
that his lights on such high beam would have revealed persons or vehicles at least 350 feet ahead of him as required
by Section 57-7-196.
Under these circumstances it is interesting to note what
a perusal of the pictures in evidence will show as to the view,
and what the map, defendant's Exhibit 1, will show. Had
the plaintiff used the high beam or bright lights as he should
have done, continuing at the rate of speed he was going, he
would have been able to see the defendant's train from the
moment it started across the canal bridge 60 feet from the
center of the pavement, assuming of course that he was close
enough so that his bright lights would show far enough
ahead. Clearly he could have done so at any time after he
was within 350 feet. The freight train started from a complete stop at such point of the bridge, and in traveling the
60 feet plus until it got over the center of the highway, it
did not move over two miles an hour. During that same
time the plaintiff's automobile was traveling approximately
50 miles an hour on his own testimony, or 25 times as fast
I
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as the train. At two miles an hour the train would go ap ..
proximately three feet per second and it would thus take
it 20 seconds to move the 60 feet to the center of the roadway.
The plaintiff at 50 miles an hour would move 73.33 feet
per second and thus in 20 seconds would go approximately
1467 feet, or considerably in excess of a quarter of a mile.
Of course \Ve would not expect the plaintiff to see the defendant's train as it started · over this canal bridge and approached the high,vay when he was a quarter of a mile away,
but at some point after the time the defendant passed
the highway patrolman's car - if he had been maintaining a proper lookout ahead and not spending too much
time looking through his rear view mirror, and if he had had
lights which would show or reveal persons or vehicles "at
a safe distance in advance of the vehicle" he was drivinghe could not have avoided seeing the defendant's train in
time to bring his vehicle to a stop, disregarding any question
of flagman or signals from any member of the train crew.
Approaching the question from another view, the evidence shows that the plaintiff's car traveled almost in a direct line in the center of his lane of traffic. (See pictures,
Exhibits C and D.) By Exhibit D it is shown that the rear
wheels skidded slightly toward the side of the road, the skid
marks showing that those wheels did not come as close to the
track as the front wheels, which proceeded in a straight line.
The plaintiff's lane of travel or half of the pavement was 11
feet in width, and some high point on the front of his carapparently the radiator ornament-struck the floor sill and
side of the beet car. This point of impact was eight feet from
the end of the beet car (Tr. 337). Therefore, in order for
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plaintiff's automobile to strike the beet car at such point,
the front or end of the beet car, from a standpoint of physical fact, had to be some two or three feet over the center
line of the pavement. This is further confirmed by the fact
that by measurement it was determined that the beet car
traveled just 10 feet after the impact and when it came to
rest was some little distance over the north or northwesterly
half of the pavement (Tr. 203). That north half of the pavement being 11 feet wide and the beet car extending some
distance beyond and having traveled only 10 feet from the
point of impact, it is a demonstrated physical fact that the
front end of such beet car was at least two feet or more
over and to the northwest of the center line of the highway
at the moment of impact.
It was determined by the highway .patrolman from the
damage done and other evidence at the scene of the accident
that the speed of the plaintiff's car at the moment of impact
was still 3.0 miles an hour (T'r. 165). Mrs. Archibald estimated that such speed at the moment of impact was at least
40 miles an hour (T'r. 2.10). The plaintiff's brother, the
morning after the accident, stepped off the distance of the
skid marks, and then a month or so later actually measured
the skid marks, and at such time, a month later, by actual
measurement he measured the skid marks at 83 feet, and he
stated, "the skid marks are still visible today" (T'r. 148).
On the night of the accident the highway patrolman measured these skid marks and found that the longest one was
85 feet (Tr. 163), and that all four of the wheels had skidded
and left visible marks upon the pavement.
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The plaintiff produced an engineer, Professor Harold
S. Carter, and upon putting a hypothetical question to him
asked 'vhat rate of speed a car would have been going at
the beginning of an 83-foot skid mark assuming that the
speed of the car at the end of the 83-foot skid mark was 30
miles an hour. Professor Carter stated that assuming the
speed was 30 miles at the moment of impact after skidding
for 83 feet, the speed at the moment of inception of the skid
would have been 50 miles an hour (Tr. 2·48). He further
stated that if the plaintiff's car was going 40 miles an hour
at the moment of the impact, then the speed at the inception
of the skid would have been 571;2 miles an hour (Tr. 2~5~0).
It is rather interesting to note that when it was called to
Professor Carter's attention that the skid marks were 85
feet instead of 83 feet, and the speed at the moment of impact was 30 miles per hour, he still tried to assist plaintiff
in trying to say that it would not make much difference but
finally admitted that 85 feet of skid marks would indicate
a speed of 51 miles per hour. His answer was: "That two
feet does not make much difference. The 85 feet would
represent 51 miles an hour, to be specific" (Tr. 2~56).
Considering the testimony of Mrs. Archibald, who estimated the speed at the time of the impact to be 40 miles
an hour, and that of head brakeman Turley, who estimated
the speed of plaintiff's car as it came along the highway to
be 6H miles an hour, plus this admission of Professor Carter
that 85 feet of skid marks would indicate at least 51 miles an
hour, there was ample evidence from which the jury could
concl ud.e that plaintiff was exceeding the speed limit of 50
miles an hour.
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For the purpose of further argument let us admit that
plaintiff's speed at the moment of the inception of the skid
was 50 miles an hour and at the moment of impact 30 miles
an houJ::. Plaintiff would have been traveling an average
speed of 40 miles an hour over the last 85 feet, and approximately 50 miles an hour for some distance prior to the inception of the skidding of his car. At the moment of impact
the defendant's freight car was some 121 to 14 feet from the
southeasterly edge of the pavement, Mr. Squires testifying
that it was at least six feet on the pavement when he yelled,
Mr. Hickman saying it was half or more over his lane, and
the measurement on the car indicating that the point of
impact was at least eight feet back from the forward end.
Assuming for purpose of argument that the front of the car
was therefore 13 feet from the southeast edge of the pavement, we would then have the following situation: the
freight car had traveled over this 13 feet of pavement, plus
eight feet of shoulder, at the rate of two miles an hour; at
two miles an hour or 2.9· feet per second it would take slightly
in excess of seven seconds for the freight car to travel this
21 feet; at an average of 40 miles an hour, which is 58.67
feet per second, it would take plaintiff's· automobile 1.44
seconds to go the 85 feet through which the car skidded,
and in the remaining time out of the seven seconds or in the
other 5.5-6 seconds when plaintiff's car was going 50 miles
an hour, plaintiff's automobile would have traveled over 407
feet. Therefore, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff rather than as we are required to on this
appeal, most favorable to the view that would uphold the
verdict, the plaintiff in his automobile traveled over 492
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feet while the defendant's freight car was traveling the distance of 21 feet over the 8-foot shoulder and 13 feet of pavement to the point it had reached at the moment of impact.
This disregards the additional distance of 40 feet traveled
by the beet car from the canal bridge during which plaintiff
should have seen the freight car approaching from the· opposite side of the canal bridge had his lights shown from fence
to fence as he said they would have done on high beam, the
only difficulty being that plaintiff would have been so much
farther down the highway that he would not have been close
enough to see the freight car crossing the canal bridge no
matter how far ahead his light may have shown. Nevertheless, while the freight car was traveling the 21 feet over
the shoulder and pavement to the point of impact, plaintiff's
automobile traveled over 492 feet. Plaintiff's witness Professor Carter in response to a question as to the distance
necessary to bring an automobile to a stop from 5.0 miles an
hour answered that it would take 128 feet to bring the automobile to a stop without skidding the wheels (Tr. 248). The
testimony also shows from Mr. Hickman himself that an
automobile would travel 55· feet during the reaction time or
thinking time necessary before one can apply the Brakes
after seeing an object ahead when traveling at 50 miles an
hour ( Tr. 288) . Thus at 50 miles an hour, if plaintiff had
seen the train, he could have reacted and brought his automobile to a stop in 183: feet.
Assuming again the most favorable conclusion from
the record in favor of plaintiff, that during the last 85 feet
he traveled an average of 40 miles an hour and approximately
50 miles an hour prior to that time, plaintiff would cover
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the distance of 183 feet in 2.85 seconds. (At 40 miles an
hour it would take 1.44 seconds to go 8'5, feet and at 50 miles
an hour it would take 1.41 seconds to go the remaining 98
feet.) In other words, at the speed plaintiff was traveling
under his own testimony, when combined with that of his
expert Professor Carter, allowing reaction time and stopping
time, he could have brought his automobile to a stop in 183
feet, and at the speed he was traveling he covered that distance in 2.85 seconds. In 2.85 seconds defendant's train,
going at two miles an hour, would travel approximately 8.38
feet. The fact that the plaintiff's automobile struck the
freight car eight feet from the end thereof shows that the
end of this freight car was directly in front of the plaintiff
in the center of his lane of travel at approximately the moment when plaintiff was 183 feet away, at a time when had
plaintiff seen it he could have brought his vehicle to a stop
and avoided the accident.
We do not mean to hold plaintiff to mathematical exactness, but during the time that the defendant's. freight
car was proceeding over the south half of the pavement, five
or six feet thereof, in addition to the time that the freight
car was proceeding over eight feet of shoulder, plaintiff
should have seen the freight car and brought his automobile
to a stop or slowed it down so that he could bring it to a stop.
Again we repeat, the end of the freight car was at least in
the middle of plaintiff's lane of traffic, directly ahead of
him, at a time when if he had looked and seen it he could
have brought his automobile to a stop under his own testimony and under that of his expert Mr. Carter. Prior to that
time the freight car had traveled over at least 51/2 feet of
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the pavement, and with the freight car going two miles an
hour and plaintiff's automobile going 50 miles an hour during the time the freight car was traveling over that 5,112
feet, plaintiff's automobile would have been traveling over
an additional137.5 feet. In other words, taking the figures
and the speeds which are most favorable to plaintiff, the
plaintiff traveled over a distance in excess of 320 feet in his
approach to the crossing after the moment the freight car
entered upon the actual pavement. If we add to that the
distance of eight feet of shoulder, the plaintiff at 25· times
the speed of the defendant's freight car would travel an additional 200 feet, or at the moment the fre-ight car entered
upon the shoulder adjoining the pavement, the plaintiff was
considerably in excess of 500 feet away. If the jury believed
brakeman Turley's testimony that plaintiff was traveling
60 miles an hour, this distance would be much greater.
These are mathematical calculations based upon the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and in view
of them it is inconceivable how any conclusion could have
been reached but that the plaintiff either failed to look or
failed to heed what he saw, or was driving at such an exorbitant rate of speed that his vehicle was hurtling into the
night far beyond the range of any safe vision which he had.
Squires confirms Turley in indicating that plaintiff's speed
was in excess of 50 miles an hour where he states that he took
the plaintiff Hiclanan and his attorney to the scene of the
accident, pointed out the approximate point where he had
yelled to Hickman, and then with his car at 50 miles per
hour demonstrated to them that he could stop before reaching the track (Tr. 315, 316).
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From these facts the jury was warranted in believing
that the defendant's freight car was upon and occupying
the highway for much more than ample time for plaintiff
to have seen it and stopped had he been keeping a proper
lookout with his auto under control.
This case on these facts is not new as far as this court
is concerned but is very similar to the case of Ha:arstrieh
v. Oreg·on Short Line R·. Co., 70 Utah 5~52, 2162 P. 100. In
that case it was a guest in the car rather than the driver
.who was plaintiff, and it was determined that the driver's
negligence could not be imputed to the plaintiff. This court
however held that in spite of any claimed negligence on behalf of the defendant the negligence of the driver of the
automobile was the sole, proximate cause of the accid~nt, and
while the court did not directly so find, it seriously questioned whether or not the defendant could have been charged
with negligence at all. In that case the defendant railroad
company was backing a gondola car across the highway.
The gondola car was black and dark-the one in the case
at bar was similar to the gondola except that it was red,
and different from the usual gondola had high beet-rack
sides (See Exhibit B). In that case it was claimed by the
plaintiff that "suddenly and without any previous warning,
whistle, bell, or other signal, defendant negligently and carelessly" backed a string of cars over the highway. 'lt was
also alleged "that there was. neither switchman, brakeman,
nor light on the said gondola car, and no flagman at said
crossing, and when the front end of said car entered Beck
street and crossing the said automobile was so close that
in spite of every effort on the part of the driver of said auto-
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mobile to stop or s'verve out of the path of said gondola car,
the said automobile collided therewith, * * *."
In that case the driver of the car did attempt to turn
·with the train to try and avoid the collision. In the case at
bar the plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to turn in
spite of the fact that a roadway entered the highway from
the north with a wide graveled approach at- a 45""degree
angle (See Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). The only explanation that
the plaintiff in this case made concerning his failure to turn
one way or the other was : "I did not know how far I was
from the track and I tkoug ht I could stop" ( Tr. 2•9'5.) . (I talics ours.)
In the Haarstrich case it was determined that the gondola car was moving five or six miles an hour and the automobile in "\vhich plaintiff was riding 25· or 30. Thus it was
determined that the automobile was traveling five times as
fast as the freight car. In the case at bar there is no escape
from the testimony other than to conclude that the pJaintiff's automobile was traveling 20 to 2:5 times as fast as the
freight car. In the Haarstrich case the automobile struck
the gondola 26 feet behind the front end thereof, whereas
in the case at bar the plaintiff's automobile struck the beet
car eight feet from the front, but by comparing the speeds
of the freight cars and the vehicles involved, the eight feet
in the case at bar would be comparable to five times that
amount when comparing it with the Haarstrich case.
Apparently in the Haarstrich case, just as in the case
at bar, it was the guest and not the driver who saw the train
first and yelled, "There is a train."
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In the Haarstrich case this court said, after referring
to speeds and distances :

"* * * The decisive question therefore is, At
what point on the highway was the automooile when
the defendant's car entered upon the paved highway? * * *"
Inasmuch as the automobile was traveling five times the
speed of the freight car, it was determined that the automobile was 210 feel from the crossing at the time the freight
car entered upon the pavement. In the case at bar the measurements and other testimony show that the defendant's
be·et car had traveled at least 13 feet over the pavement at
the point of impact, and even had the plaintiff's automobile
been going only 40 miles an hour for the entire distance,
that would have been 20 times the speed of two miles an
hour which the freight car was traveling, and on that basis
during the time the freight car traveled the 13 feet the plaintiff's car would travel 2;60 feet. If we take the 50l-mile an
hour figure, the plaintiff's car was going 2:5· times the speed
of the freight car, and while the freight car was going the
13 feet over the pavement, plaintiff's automobile would go
32'5- feet. If we take brakeman Turley's. testimony that plaintiff's automobile was going 60 miles an hour or 30 times the
speed of the freight car, and the jury was entitled to and
may have believed that testimony, then plaintiff's automobile
was 390 feet from the crossing when defendant's beet car
entered upon the pavement. And in all of this, plaintiff's
own evidence shows that at 50 miles an hour-the speed
he claimed to have been traveling-his automobile could
have been brought to a stop in 128 feet plus such time as
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was necessary for reaction, which he estimated to be 55
feet. There is no escape from the conclusion from these
facts that the defendant's car was upon the highway during
the time when plaintiff was traveling at least double the
distance which would have been necessary to react and
bring his automobile to a stop. The conclusion of this court
in the Haarstrich case is very applicable wherein the court
said:

"* * * In view of the indubitable facts disclosed by the evidence, it is wholly immaterial whether
the defendant strictly complied with the law as to
warnings and signals. Its failure in that regard, if
there was a failure, which is very doubtful, had
nothing whatever to do with the accident and was
in no sense the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
* * *"
The l-Iaarstrich case is so comparable in its facts to the
case at bar that in the opinion of respondent it should be
controlling. There are other things, however, which in respondent's opinion have an additional bearing upon the
question of the plaintiff's negligence and we think they
should be pointed out to the court, disregarding for the
time being any question of the defendant's negligence.
The plaintiff himself testified, "This car was about
half-way into my lane of traffic, or a little more, when 'l first
observed it" ( Tr. 2,29). Therefore, the freight car had trav~
eled for at least six feet over the pavement before the plaintiff ever saw it. During this time plaintiff had been traveling
25 times as fast as the freight car had. What had he been
doing? Had he been looking in his rear view mirror watch-
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ing the highway patrolman, or what else had he been doing
that had prevented him from seeing the freight car? At 25
times the speed the freight car was traveling, the plaintiff
had thus traveled 150 feet after the freight car entered upon
the pavement before plaintiff saw the freight car. What
was the reason plaintiff had not seen the approaching freight
car while traveling over that six feet of pavement or over
the adjoining eight feet of shoulder? Was it becaus·e plaintiff dimmed his lights 1500 feet away and then continued
at 50 miles an hour while, according to his own testimony,
his lights on dim would not show an object more than 75
or 100 feet ahead of him on the highway, and when there
was no approaching vehicle closer than 3,000 feet away?
This admission on the part of the plaintiff that he traveled
the 1500 feet to the crossing with his lights on dim without
reducing his speed from 50 miles an hour is astounding. At
50 miles an hour an object travels 73.33. feet a secona, and it
takes three-quarters of a second or 5·5· feet for a person to
react when he sees something, and yet in spite of that fact
and in spite of the fact that it would take 128 feet to stop
his vehicle at such speed, plaintiff continued at 50 miles an
hour with his lights on low beam clear up to the point of the
collision.
c:ache County is a well known dairy section. There are
a lot of cattle and horses in the county and in the vicinity
where this a·ccident occurred (Tr. 288). There were homes
in the vicinity and at least two side roads appToaching and
intersecting Highway 91 from each direction in the immediate vicinity of the crossing (T·r. 2-89, Exhibit 1). If a person or an animal had been on the road, the plaintiff would
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not have been able to stop and would have hit it just as he
did the train. The attitude of the plaintiff is shown by the
plaintiff's response to a question asked of him as to whether
or not he would have hit a person if the person had been
on the road. His answer was, "They would be able to see my
lights," and he would depend upon their seeing his lights
and getting out of his way ( Tr. 2.93) . The conclusion is~ inescapable that the plaintiff was not driving his automobile
as a reasonable man would have done, and when there was
no necessity under the statute to dim his lights, he dimmed
them and continued at a high rate of speed, and contrary to
statute, he did not, as Section 57-7 -19·7 requires, use a distribution of light or composite beam directed high enough and
of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles a sufficient distance in advance of his automobile.
Another case decided by this court that can be given application under the facts of this case is that of Dalley v. MidWestern Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 3:31, 15 P. 2d 309. The
evidence in that case showed that the plaintiff's automobile
was equipped with good lights and four-wheel brakes in good
condition. His lights would disclose ordinary objects about
100 feet ahead and 10 feet to the side of the road. Tlie traveled portion of the road was about 20 feet wide, smooth and
level. The plaintiff drove his automobile into the rear of a
truck parked on the righthand side of the roadway with no
lights. Plaintiff was traveling about 25, miles an hour and
did not see the truck until he was within 15· or 20 feet of it.
Had he seen the truck sooner he could have turned out to
miss it or could have 'stopped. The road over which he was
traveling was straight for a mile or more before he reached
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the· place: where the truck was standing, and was also straight
for a mile beyond where the truck was standing, just as was
true in the case at bar. The highway over which he was
traveling was much frequented; he was aware that there
may be persons walking or riding on horseback or in horsedrawn vehicles along the highway. He claimed to have been
keeping a lookout ahead but nevertheless did not see the
truck until he was 15 or 20 feet from it.
This court sustained the trial court in granting a motion
of nonsuit and dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and in doing
so stated:
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established
'that it is negligence as matter of law for a person
to drive and automobile upon a traveled public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians, at such a rate
of speed that said automobile cannot be stopped within the distance at which the operator of said car is
able to see objects upon the highway in front of him.'
In the case of Nikoleropoulos v. Rams·ey, 6.1 Utah 465,
214 P. 304, the language just quoted is said to be a
correct statement of the law and that the refusal of
the trial court to so instruct the jury was prejudicial
error. In the case of 0' Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368,
213' P. 791, 792, it is said:
" 'But entirely apart from any statutory requirements, the law requires that, if a person desires to
operate his automobile on the public streets or highways after dark, he must see to it that it is equipped
with proper, suitable, and sufficient lights, so that
the oper~ tor may discover any objects or obstructions that may be encountered on the highway. The
law in that regard is clearly and tersely stated in
Serfas v. Lehigh, etc., Ry. Co., 270 Pa. 306·, 113 A.
3f70, 14 A. L. R. 791, where the court, in speaking of
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the duty of the operator of an automobile to have the
same equipped with proper lights, said:
" ' "* * * It is the duty of a chauffeur traveling by nig·ht to have such a headlight as will enable
him to see in advance the face of the highway and
to discover grade crossings, or other obstacles in his
path, in time for his own safety, and to keep such
control of his car as will enable him to stop and avoid
obstructions that fall within his vision.' "
" 'In the case of Lauson v. Fon du Lac, (Wis.)
123 N. W. 629, the law is stated in the headnote as
follows:
" ' "Independent of any statute, it is negligence
to run an automobile on a highway at night without
sufficient lights to enable the driver to see objects
ahead of him in time to a void them." ' "
(Numerous similar cases cited.)
The plaintiff had testified that he was keeping a lookout ahead, but the court determined that physical facts
showed otherwise. The court stated :

"* * * As plaintiff approached the place
where the truck was standing on the night in question, the highway was straight and level for a distance of at least a mile. The truck was directly in
front of him and in his course of travel. According
to his testimony he was keeping a constant lookout
ahead. If he was not keeping a lookout ahead, he
was guilty of negligence in failing to do so. There
was nothing to obstruct his view. It was an ordinary,
clear, quiet summer night with no moon. So far as
appears there was nothing to divert his attention
from the road in front of him. * * * In such
case it must inevitably follow that plaintiff did not
keep a lookout ahead, or, if he did, he either did not
heed what he saw or he could not see the truck because his lights were not such as were prescribed by
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law. No matter which horn of the dilemma is taken,
the result is the same, viz., plaintiff was negligent.
Had plaintiff seen the truck 50 or more feet before
he reached the place where it was parked, he could,
according to his testimony, have avoided the accident.
It follows that his failure to discover the truck sooner
was a proximate cause of the accident and resulting
InJury. * * *
"What we conceive to be the weight of authority
is in accord with the rule which prevails in this jurisdiction. The rule is also well established in this
in common with other jurisdictions, that where the
evidence relied upon by the plaintiff to establish
some material issue of his alleged cause of action is
inherently impossible of being true in the light of
facts which are established beyond controversy, then
and in such case it becomes the duty of the court to
take the cause from the jury and deny plaintiff the
relief prayed. Wilkinson v. O·regon Short Line R.
Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466; Oswald v. Utah Light &
Ry. Co., 39 Utah 2·45·, 117 P. 46,; Lawrence v. Denver
& R. G. R. Co·., 52 Utah 414, 174 P. 817; 0' Brien v.
Alston, supra; Mc·Carthy v. Bangor & Aroostook R.
Co., 112· Me. 1, 90 A. 490, L. R. A. 19!t5B, 140."
This Dalley v. Mid-Western case has been cited and discussed in a number of cases in this court since it was. originally given. In Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56. P. 2d 1366,
Justice Wolfe in a dissenting opinion questioned the Dalley
v. Mid-Western decision and said:

'' * * *

When the point decided in that case
directly comes before this court in some future case,
I hope to pay my respects to it. * * *"
However, in that dissenting opinion Justice Wolfe referred to the fact and made the basis of his distinction the
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fact that in the case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah
465, 214 P. 304, the man struck was lawfully and rightfully
on the highvvay, while in the Dalley case it was a violation of
the law to have the truck as it '\Vas left on the highway. He
said:

"* * * I think the traveler should be given
the benefit of some presumption that others have not
wrongfully obstructed the highway. Be that as. it
may, at this juncture the state of the law in this jurisdiction is that Bosone was negligent. * * *"
Bosone had turned onto a new strip of highway and then
swerved to miss an unlighted barricade which defendants
had erected, and in swerving to the other side Bosone collided with the plaintiff.
In this Hickman case now before the court the railroad
company was not wrongfully upon the ·highway. It was not
violating any law in crossing the highway but had an absolute right to proceed over the highway as. it was doing.
Hickman was well acquainted with the crossing, knew it
was there, and was bound to anticipate that trains or cars
might be on the crossing.
There is testimony in the case at bar from the plaintiff
and from some of his witnesses that they did not hear any
whistle or bell. However, the testimony of the train crew is
very definite that the whistle was sounded as the movement
started over the highway and that the bell was ringing continuously. It is not likely that the plaintiff did hear the
whistle as given nor that he would have heard the ringing
bell. The train had traveled over 60 feet after it started into
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this highway before the collision, and at the time the train
started, when the whistle was sounded, plaintiff would· have
been too far away to hear it anyway, and at the speed he
was traveling, with the hum of his tires and the roar of his
motor, as testified to by brakeman Belnap (Tr. 358, 3-59), it
is. very unlikely that he would have· heard a bell regardless
of how much it was rung on the engine eight car lengths
away from the highway.
Plaintiff may contend that the defendant was not lawfully on the highway, but before starting across the highway the train was brought to a complete stop, and the rear
brakeman, as well as other members of the crew, gave convincing testimony that no automobiles were then in sight.
The rear brakeman himself was on the highway flagging
approaching traffic, and according to his testimony, was
doing all he could to warn the plaintiff and flag him down.
The roar of the motor and the hum of plaintiff's tires called
Belnap's. attention to the approach of the car to such an
extent that in his efforts to flag he did not even know of
the approach of Mrs. Archibald (T'r. 358.). If the jury believed this testimony-which they were entitled to believe-there can be no possible doubt but what the railroad company had an absolute right to proceed as it was proceeding,
and it was not violating any law whatsoever in doing so and
was not guilty of negligence under the circumstances.
Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion in Bullock v. Luke,
9'8 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350, again questions the Dalley v. MidWestern case and refers to his opinion in Hansen v. Clyde,
and also to the distinction in situations whe·re the stage has
been set (as he says referring to the Dalley case) , and where
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the situation is a rapidly changing one. In the case at bar
the situation was a changing one; however, with respect to
the freight car was not changing rapidly. In the Bullock
case Justice Wolfe stated another illustration as "where one
enters the intersection definitely with the right-of-way and
with due care in relation to any other also exercising due
care and assumes his right-of-way to his injury. He should
be allowed to recover." It is very definite that the train of
the defendant in this case entered the intersection "definitely
with the right-of-way and with due care in relation to any
other also exercising due care." The defendant should be
entitled to recover here in the sense that the claim of the
plaintiff should not prevail.
In the case at bar it is demonstrated that anyone else
entering the intersection "also exercising due care" had
nothing to fear. Mrs. Archibald was approaching this crossing at the same rate of speed the plaintiff was. Mrs. Archibald saw the flagman's lantern (T'r. 197) and saw the train
in time to bring her vehicle to a stop and to avoid any collision with it, and Mrs. Archibald saw the outline of the
train or the approaching car because plaintiff's lights shown
upon it (Tr. 1901;2, 207), and also saw brakeman Belnap
because plaintiff's lights shone upon him (Tr. 19'7). Thus
plaintiff's lights would include some spread of the highway
even though he testified that on dim, as he was traveling,
they would show only 75 to 100 feet ahead.
In the Bullock case Justice w·olfe went on to say:
"In this case Bullock was driving per se negligently; that is, in relation to another exercising due
care. His driving would have been negligent if Luke
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had been nowhere near, although it might then have
resulted in no harm. * * *"
In this Hickman case it would have been negligence for
Hiclonan to drive as he did even if the train had been nowhere around or if the beet car struck had instead been a
person or an animal.
In the case of Niels·en v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P.
2d 117, where the question was raised on demurrer, the
plaintiff had collided with a parked truck immediately after
. being blinded by the lights of another car. This court said
of the D~alley case and other similar cases :

"* * * None of the cited cases are controlling of the case at hand. The complaint here questioned is silent as to whether the highway near where
the truck was par ked is straight or crooked, level, or
otherwise. If the truck could not, because of some
obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached it prior to the time they were blinded, and
if plaintiff's husband was driving at a lawful rate
of speed an automobile properly equipped with lights
and brakes without any reason to believe the headlights of another automobile would suddenly or unexpectedly blind him; that while so blinded the collision occurred without time for him to reduce his
speed or stop his automobile, the rule announced in
the cases relied upon by defendant and heretofore
cited in this opinion would not apply. Under such
circumstances it may not be said that plaintiff's husband was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory
negligence. * * *"
On the other hand, if one is momentarily blinded and
does have time to reduce his speed or stop and fails to do so,
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then he can be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
What then would be the rule with respect to a man who is
not blinded by the lights of an approaching automobile but
'vho, when an automobile is 3000 or more feet away from
him, dims his lights so he can see only 75 to 100 feet ahead
of him and then without slackening speed, hurtles through
the night at a speed of 50 miles an hour or more into collision
with something that had he not had his lights on dim or had
he slackened his speed when he dimmed his lights, he would
have seen in ample time to have brought his. car to a stop
without any difficulty. Respondent earnestly contends that
under such a situation such a driver should be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In the case at bar, however, in spite of a motion for directed verdict, the court submitted the n1atter to a jury, and the jury, either on the basis
of sole negligence on the part of the plaintiff or at least on
the basis of contributory negligence, decided against him.
In spite of the questions that have been raised with respect to the Dalley v. Mid-Western case, it has not as yet
been overruled but some of, these distinctions have been
pointed out.
In the case of Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98
Utah 253, 98 P. 2d 3.63, this court refers to and quotes from
the Watanabe case and also refers to the, rule of the Dalley
case. The rule of the Dalley case was not changed there. It
was not overruled but distinguished from the facts set up
in the Moss case.
In Olson v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 2:08, 98
P. 2d 944, which involved running into a caboose standing
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ment for the plaintiff. This court reversed the trial court,
citing both the Haarstrich case and the Dalley case, as well
as the Ramsey case. This court in citing the Dalley and
Ramsey cases said :

"* * * While a railroad company is not excused from exercising reasonable care to prevent collisions and while many conditions may exist which
should put them on notice that motorists might be
endangered and therefore enjoin on them the positive
duty to give warning, yet when they are using their
right-of-ways in a careful and lawful manner they
have a right to presume that motorists on crossing
streets will proceed carefuUy· and lawfully and wiU
drive with their c·ars in such control as to be able to
stop· within the distance at which they can S'ee objects
ahead. * * * We hold in conformance with
what appears to us to be the great weight of authority that the presence of a train on a track itself furnishes a warning to motorists, unless conditions exist
which should cause the train crew to realize that
motorists might not see the cars, in which event
some additional warning may be required to satisfy
the standard of due care." (Italics ours.)
In this Hickman case there was competent evidence from
which the jury could conlude that the night was a bright
moonlight night, the sky was clear and the moon had been
up for approximately an hour (Exhibit 9). The train crew
stopped the train movement as it came to the edge of the
highway right-of-way and then proceeded very slowly, evidently having in mind that at the slow speed an approaching vehicle could more than likely pass around the end of
the car if it ':Vas coming too fast to stop, and if not, and if
the ·cars had proceeded far enough across the highway to
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block it, then any approaching vehicle with proper lights,
driving at a proper rate of speed, should be able to see the
cars upon the highway. This was not all. The rear brakeman stopped the movement and let some approaching automobiles go by so that when he started the movement across
there was not an automobile in sight upon a straight street
extending over a mile in either direction (T'r. 35·6, 3·57).
That was not all. The brakeman stood on the highway-it
matters not whether the center or the edge-and waved his
lantern, and from the testimony of brakeman Belnap the
jury had competent evidence, if it chose to believe it, from
which it could conclude that the brakeman did all he could
in v1aving the lantern so that approaching vehicles from
either direction could see it (Tr. 361). Brakeman Belnap
continued to \vave such lantern until, as he said, "I got out
of his way and kept from getting killed" ( Tr. 363) .
The most recent case in which the Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy case has been referred to is the case of H ovrsley
v. Robinson, .. Utah .. , 186· P. 2d 5·92.. In that case the
defendant's bus vvas being operated on a highway at such
a speed that it could not be stopped when an automobile
·- · · skidded in front of it. Referring to the Nikoleropoulos v.
Ramsey case, the court said :

"* * * We held that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, no matter how dark and
stormy the night or how bad the visibility, if he
drove at such a rate of speed that he was unable to
avoid running plaintiff down within the distance
plaintiff could be seen walking ahead of defendant's
car on the highway. To the same effect see: Dalley
v. Mid!-Western Dairy Produc-ts Co., 80 Utah 331,
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15, P. 2d 309~; Hamrstric'h v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 70 Utah 5,5,2, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston, 61
Utah 368, 2:13 P. 791."

This court further stated in the case of Horsley v. Robinson:
"The Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in substance a holding that it is negligence to operate avehicle on the highvv-ay at any time without having it
under sufficient control so that others using the
highway will not be unreasonably endangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is required to travel to
acco1n plish that end. If that is the rule where visibility is involved, it follows that the same rule ap. plies where the lack of control which endangers
others is the result of slippery roads and stormy
conditions. * * *"
If that is the rule where visibility is involved, then the
rule should be directly applicable to this Hickman case where
on a man's own testimony he dimmed his lights contrary
to statute when there was no necessity to do so and continued traveling at a speed of 50 miles an hour when with such
dimmed lights he ·could only see 7S to 100 feet ahead of him,
and neither turned his lights back to high beam nor slackened the speed of his car until it was too late to avoid a
collision with de!endant's train, which had completely cov·
ered his side of the highway and ·a portion of the- other side.
Under the Haarstrich ·case, and under the Dalley case
as it has been discussed and referred to in these other cases,
the plaintiff, Othello. Hickman~ should have been held guilty
of negligence as a matter of law on his own testimony.
Clearly when the matter was submitted to a jury and a jury
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decided against him, there is more than substantial evidence
in this record to sustain the verdict of the jury and the
judgment based thereon.
In addition to the foregoing cases, we wish to call the
court's attention to the following cases decided in this court,
all of which would have some bearing upon the issues herein
and would assist this court in determining whether or not
from the evidence introduced at the trial there was sufficient
to warrant a jury in finding that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence :

Nabrotsky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 1031 Utah
274, 135 P. 2d 115.

Nuttall v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah
383, 99 p. 2d 15.

Drummond v. Union Pacific R. Co., .. Utah .. ,
177 P. 2d 903.

Van Wa-goner v. Union Pacific R. Co., .. Utah
.. , 186 P. 2d 293.

Similar cases from other jurisdictions upon the same
subject matter are very numerous, but we cite the following
as a few which may be of some assistance to the court :

Sailors v. Lowden, (Neb.) 299 N. W. 510.
Shepard v. Thompson, (Kan.) 109, P. 2d 12~6·.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Reynolds, (Ky.) 202

s. w. 2'd 99'7.

Fleming v. Loch, (Okla.) 195, P. 2d 942.
Kurn v. Jones, (Okla.) 101 P. 2d 242.
Kennedty v. Laramee, (Vt.) 61 A. 2d 547.
Jones v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (Del.) 61 A. 2d
691.
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Chicago, B. & Q·. R. Ca. v. Ruatn Transpor'bation
Corp., (8th Circuit Iowa) 171 F. 2d 781.
Evans v. Georgia Northern R. Co., (Ga.) 52- S.
E. 2d 28.

Cleveland, C. C. & S't. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie,
(Ind.) 1'73 N. E. 708.
s·chrader v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., (N.Y.) 172
N. E. 2;72·.
Doty v. Southern Pa.cific, (Ariz.) 12:9· P. 2d 991.
With respect to the question of defendant's ·negligence,
we would like to refer the court to the complaint. In paragraph II of the complaint, page 1 of the transcript, the plaintiff charges the defendant with negligence "in that it failed
to keep .a careful or any lookout for automobiles crossing
said track, in failing to observe Plaintiff's said automobile
and in failing to have any light on said train ; that Defendant was further careless and negligent in the operation of
said locomotive and train in not causing the bell upon said
locomotive to be rung, or its whistle or siren blown, or to
give any other signal or warning of the presence or approach
of said locomotive train and cars at any point within sight
or hearing of said crossing."
There is testimony from the defendant's witnesses
which cannot be disputed that the bell was being rung continuously. The fact the plaintiff and his witnesses did not
hear it would not be controlling because the testimony does
not show that any of such witnesses were in a position to
have heard the bell, and lack of whistle or bell could not have
been in any way a proximate cause of the accident involved
in this case.
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It is charged that the defendant "failed to keep a careful
or any lookout." There is no evidence of failure to keep or
maintain any lookout. On the contrary, the only evidence
in the case indicates that there was a careful lookout kept
and maintained by all the members of the crew. They
stopped at the edge of the highway to let approaching traffic
go by, and as the movement started no car was in sight in
either direction. The flagman Belnap observed plaintiff's
car coming and tried to flag him. The head brakeman observed the car and watched it, estimating the speed as it
traveled broadside to his view to be 60 miles an hour. The
engineer saw and observed the approaching automobile.
All of the testimony indicates that a careful lookout was
kept.
With respect to this question of lookout, we would like
to refer the court to the case of Van Wag'Oner v. Union
Pacific R. Co., . . Utah .. , 186 P. 2d 29'3·, where it was
claimed that a proper lookout was not maintained, and
wherein this court held that the only direct evidence in this
case indicated that the train crew was keeping a proper
lookout.

This leaves the charges of negligence in plaintiff's complaint as being only "failing to have any light on said train
* * * or to give any other signal or warning of the pres- ence or approach of said locomotive train and cars at any
point within sight or hearing of said crossing."

The law does not require that defendant have lights
, on its freight trains. However, if there is no light, and if
circumstances and conditions are such as would require more
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than statuto-ry warnings, the matter may be submitted to
a jury for a jury to determine if the railroad ·company should
have done something more th~n it did do to warn approaching travelers and give them protection at the crossing. In this
case there was competent testimony which the jury could
have believed that a flagman was on the crossing with his
brakeman's lantern doing all he could to warn approaching
traffic, and particularly the plaintiff. Thus-, from the evidence in this case on this question of the failure to do something more, there was ample evidence from which the jury
·could have believed that the defendant railroad company did
attempt to give warning and did all that was reasonably necessary of it, and the jury from such evidence could thus have
found that the defendant was not negligent in any respect.

REPLY TO AP·PELLANT'S ARGUMENT' UNDER
SPECIFIC ASSIGNME.NT:S OF' ERROR.
kS8IGNMENTS 1 AND 2 CONC'E.RNING ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS.
In his assignments of errors Nos. 1 and 2, appellant complains that the court erred in admitting over plaintiff's objection the pictures introduced as. defendant's Exhibits 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6, and in refusing to strike the photographs from
the record after their admission.
The witness Benny Degn, a photographer produced by
plaintiff himself, admitted that the .Exhibits- 2, 3, 4, 5· and
6 were a fair representation of the surrounding territory
and approach to the crossing at the time of the accident
(Tr. 130-134). Plaintiff's brother, V. L. Hickman, admitted
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the same \vith respect to Exhibit 2 (Tr. 146). The defendant produced M. E. Goodnow, who had been up to the scene
of the accident shortly after it occurred, and he likewise
stated that the pictures fairly reflected the view one could
see at the time of the accident (T'r. 382).
Wigmore, Third Edition, Vol. III, Sec. 792., page 178:
"A photograph, like a map or diagram, is a witness' pictured expression of the data observed by
him and therein communicated to the tribunal more
accurately than by words. lts use for this purpose
is sanctioned beyond question."
And again in subparagraph (3) of Sec. 792, page 185:
"The objection that a photograph may be so
made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness ; but it is of
no validity. It is true that a photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object. But so also can any witness
lie in his words. * * * If a qualified observer
is found to say, 'This photograph represents the fact
as I saw it,' there is no more reason to exclude it
than if he had said, ~The following words represent
the fact as I saw it,' which is always in effect the
tenor of a witness' oath. * * *"
The question of admissibility of such photographs was
passed upon favorably by this court in a rather early case.
The case of Dederichs v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 14 Utah 137,
46 P. 656, involved a collision between an electric traction
car and a horse and wagon. The matter was tried twice and
came to this court on appeal twice. On the second trial the
defendant offered in evidence three photographs showing
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the surroundings and locality where the accident had occured. These photographs had been taken three and one-half
years after the accident, hut the plaintiff testified that there
was 'no difference in the conditions existing at the time the
pictures were taken from those surrounding the accident
at the time it happened "and that the situation was the
same as shown on the photographs that it was at the time
of the accident. * * * These photographs exhibited
the surface condition of the streets, buildings, trees, cars,
railroad track, poles, and distances * * · *" The trial
court on objection refused to admit the photographs in evidence and the case was appealed on this ground alone and
reversed by this court. This court held such photographs
to be admissible on the basis that they had been verified
by the testimony of -vvitnesses to be a correct representation
of the locality of the accident. ln that connection this court
stated:
"If any difference had arisen concerning the
photographs being taken at a different season of the
year, it could have been explained. * * *"
The same ruling was. made by this court in the case of
Johns,on v. Union Pacific R. Co., 35· Utah 285, 100 P. 3,90.
Counsel has not found many cases where the matter has
been raised before this court. However, the question has
been raised numerous times in other jurisdictions. A recent
Montana case, Pilg,eram v. Haas, (Mont.) 167 P. 2d 339~, involved a highway collision between plaintiff's automobile
and defendant's large truck-trailer combination. The trial
court there admitted in evidence photographs of the vicinity
where the collision occurred, and on appeal this was charged
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as error. The Montana Supreme Court held the photographs
were properly admitted, stating with respect to the witness
who identified the photographs :

"* * * He further testified that although he
did not take the photograph if was nevertheless a
correct representation of the surface of the highway
at and near the place of the collision in the evening
of the 25th day of May, 1942. Where the nature or
condition of a place becomes a matter of controversy
in a civil action, photographs of the place shown to
be true representations of it at the time in question
are generally admissible in evidence. Photographs
may be proved to be correct representations by witnesses other than the _person who took them. * * *"
In the case at bar plaintiff complains that one of the
witnesses testified that at the time of the accident brush
along the track was high. If plaintiff had contended that
because of high brush along the railroad right-of-way out
in the field he was unable to see the .train, then plaintiff
might have some reason to complain, or at least show by his
own testimony that conditions were different than shown
in the photographs, but plaintiff never c~ntended that any
high brush or weeds out in the field prevented him from
seeing the train. He never saw the train out in the field at
all although his passenger Mr. Squires did, and the weeds
and brush did not prevent Mr. Squires from seeing the train
out in the field. Any weeds or brush could have no effect
upon the view plaintiff would have had after the train
started over the canal bridge, nor after the train started
over the shoulder of the highway, nor at any time after the
car started over the pavement, and the car had proceeded
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over eight feet of the shoulder of the highway and six feet
of pavement while plaintiff was going 3~50 feet in his automobile before plaintiff ever saw the car at all.
We think the above cases sufficiently answer assignments of error Nos. 1 and 2,, but for the court's convenience
we refer also to the following cases:

Mason v. Allen, (Ore.) 195 P. 2d 717.
Barone v. Jones, (C'al.) 176: P. 2:d 392, 177 P. 2d
30.
16~9

Hisaw v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (Okla.)
P. 2d 281.

PLAINT'IFF'S ASSIGNMENTS O·F ERR.QR. NOS. 3
AND 4 WITH R.EFER.E;N,CE TO T'HE COURT'S INSTRU~c·T'IONS NOS. 7 AN·D 9.

Appellant complains of the latter portion of instruction No. 7, but vve would like to refer the coHrt to the first
·paragraph of instruction No. 7, which in the opinion of respondent places a greater burden upon the railroad company than is provided by law. At any rate, in the first paragraph of No. 7 the court sets forth responsibilities of the
defendant railroad company for the exercise or due care and
instructs the jury that a failure to keep the train under control and anticipate the presence of others or to otherwise
fail to exercise due care is negligence. The full last paragraph of instruction No. 7 reads:
''You are instructed that when a railroad company is using its right-of-way in a careful and lawful
manner the employees in charge of its trains have
a right to presume that motorists approaching on
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streets or highways which cross the railroad track
'viii proceed carefully and lawfully, and the railroad
company's employees have a right to presume that
motorists on the highway will drive with their cars
under such control as to be able to stop within the
distance at which they can see objects ahead."
Appellant also con1plains in assignment of error No. 4
that the latter portion of instruction No. 9 was error. However, we should read instruction No. 9 as a whole, which is
as follows:
"You are instructed that where a train crew is
engaged in a switching movement, such as is involved
in this case, the laws of Utah do not require the train
crew to put out flares on a highway when crossing
such highway ·at night, nor do they require cars in
such train to be lighted or carry any lights upon
them. Reasonable care, however, is required and it
is for you to determine from all of the facts and circumstances, whether the defendant used reasonable
care in the efforts of its employees at the highway
crossing as the train moved into the crossing. After
the cars of such a train are upon and occupying or
passing over a highway the presence of such train
or cars lawfully upon such highway is a sufficient
warning to approaching travelers and such travelers
on the highway are bound to see such train of cars
on the highway in time to stop and to avoid colliding
therewith."
It will be noted that in both instruction No. 7 and instruction No. 9 the court prefaces the particular wording
complained of by appellant with an instruction that "when
a railroad company is using its right-of-way in a careful
and Iawful manner" * * * "the presence of such train
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or cars lawfully upon such highway is a sufficient warning
to approaching travelers * * *"
I

Appellant states that the foregoing instructions when
read together "assume that the train was on the crossing
all the time while the plaintiff was a sufficient distance
away from the crossing to have looked and stopped before
colliding with the defendant's train. They also assume that
the railroad cars were lawfully upon the highway." Counsel
over looks the other portions of both of the instructions mentioned which state that the defendant was. to use reasonable
care as the train moved into the crossing and that if the
defendant failed to exercise such care in the operation of
the train at the time of the accident, such failure was negligence .. These statements are included in the identical instructions of which plaintiff complains and the instructions when
read as a whole do not assume anything. There was evidence
in the record from which the jury could have found the facts
in accordance with defendants theory that the train was on
the highway for sufficient time for plaintiff to have seen
it and stopped therefore it was proper for the court to instruct the jury as it did.
We would like to point out to counsel that in the instructions given by a court, the court is required to instruct
not only upon any theory of the case which a plaintiff may
have but also upon a defendant's theory of the case, assuming proper requests for such instructions are given. Any
litigant is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted
to the jury. This principle is so well recognized that it would
seem to be unnecessary to cite authority with respect thereto.
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However, we do call the court's attention to the following
·cases: McDonald v. Union Pacific R. Co., 109 Utah 4'9'3, 167 P.
2d 685; Pra-tt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 16H P.
· 868; Morgan v. Bingham Stage Line Co., 75, Utah 87, 2183 P.
: 160; and Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772..

The instructions as given did not assume the facts to
be one way or the other, but such instructions did allow the
~ jury to determine what the facts were with respect to the
- matters referred to. It was for the jury to determine whether
- the defendant used reasonable care in entering upon the
4
highway with its train, and also for the jury to determine
:.. whether such train or car was upon the highway for suf- ficient length of time that the plaintiff should have seen it
~~ in time to have brought his automobile to a stop to avoid
~= colliding therewith. The evidence from the plaintiff himself,
I: as well as that from other witnesses, was. ample to form a
ii basis from which the jury could determine that the particu:~ lar car which plaintiff ran into was upon the highway for a
c· sufficient length. of time for plaintiff to have seen it and
~ stopped. The defendant's theory of the case was and is that
t defendant's beet car had entered upon the paved portion of
the highway and had been upon such highway for a suffi~· cient length of time that had plaintiff been driving at a
~· reasonable rate of speed with his. automobile under proper
.;.; control and with proper lights, plaintiff would have seen the
v
_., freight car in plenty of time to have brought his automobile
~·to a stop. That being the case, the employees of the railroad
.r:::
:-;..company were entitled to assume that plaintiff would have
··.his car under control and would be able to stop within the
;.~ distance at which he could see objects ahead. This being
~

~

I>'

!'!II>'

~:,,
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defendant's theory, the defendant was entitled to have the
case presented to the jury upon that theory and the jury
was entitled to be instructed with respect thereto. If plaintiff takes issue with the law as stated in instruction No. 7
'
we will merely repeat the quotation given hereinabove from
O·lson v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 208, 98 P. 2d 944,
with respect to railroads at such crossings, that "when they
are using their right-of-ways in a careful and lawful manner
they have a right to presume that motorists on crossing
streets will proceed carefully and Ia wfully and will drive
with their cars in such control as to be able to stop within
the distance at which they can see objects ahead."
Instruction No. 7 uses that language almost verbatim
and specifically prefaces. it with the words, "when a railroad company is using its right-of-vvay in a careful and lawful manner."
In answer to plaintiff's argument on page 10 of his
brief that "there is no evidence in the record that defendant's
train was occupying or passing over the highway before
plaintiff applied his brakes," we merely refer to the physical
facts· and measurements and the argument with respect
thereto as already given earlier in this. brief. Those facts
as well as plaintiff's own testimony give overwhelming evidence that defendant's train was occupying and passing over
the highway for a considerable time before plaintiff applied
his brakes.
Plaintiff cited the case of Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah R.
Corp., 109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877. That case did not involve the driver of the car. The question there was solely one
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as to whether the guests riding in the car were guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and the court
held that with respect to such guests the question of their
contributory negligence was for the jury ; as. also the question as to whether or not the negligence of the driver was
the sole proximate cause was held for the jury. In that case
it was assumed that the driver himself was negligent, but
whatever he did or what he may have seen at the time of the
accident was not in evidence. He did not even appear at
the trial. In that Earle case at page 881 this court held:

"* * * The duty of a driver to see a train
that is approaching a crossing but not in the intersection is not as great as it is to see a train which
is on the crossing all the time while he travels an
ample distance to see and stop. * * *"
The physical facts and measurements already referred
to herein show that the beet car was on the paved portion
of the highway during a time that plaintiff traveled over
twice the distance necessary for him to have brought his
automobile to a stop.
Respondent has no quarrel with the law as cited by appellant to the effect that where there is no evidence an instruction, even though it may be abstractly correct, should
not be given, and the cases referred to by counsel-all of
them-directly state that there was no evidence on the point
upon which the instruction was given. In this case there is
ample evidence, which the jury was entitled to believe and
was entitled to be instructed upon, showing that the freight
car was on the highway in front of the plaintiff in ample
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time for plaintiff to have seen it and brought his automobile
to a stop. Therefore, there was evidence in this case to which
the instructions directly applied and evidence upon which
the jury was entitled to be instructed under defendant's
theory of the case.
With reference to the cases cited by appellant on pages
12 and 13, we call the court's attention to the fact that only
a few of those cases involved personal injuries, and of those
that did, there is not one wherein the driver of the vehicle
was the plaintiff, so except for the admitted rule that there
must be evidence in a case to warrant instructions, the cases
are not in point in any manner, and in most of those cases
the courts. found that there was no evidence either showing
or tending to show the rna tters covered by the instructions.
That is not the case here.
In addition to the cases here cited, we wish to refer
the court to the Haarstrich case, the Dalley case, and other
cases. cited earlier in this brief.
We submit that the court did not err in giving instructions 7 and 9 as complained of by plaintiff.
PLkl'NTIF'F'S ASSIGNMENT OF' ERR·OR. NO. 5
c:o:Nc:ERNING COUR'T'S INSTRU·CTION N:Q. 18.

In his argument with respect to instruction No. 18 appellant, quibbles over the use of words. Respondent feels
that questioning the use of the word "that" in the beginning
of each subparagraph of instruction No. 18 amounts to use·
less. quibbling. The court in that instruction says that IF
the jury found plaintiff to be contributorily negligent, the
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jury must find that one or more of the other matters were
true. That is merely another way of stating, "You cannot
find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence unless
you find that the plaintiff did so and so or failed to do so and
so." The prefacing of the whole instruction by the words
"if you find" submitted the matter to the jury for the jury's
determination and did not suggest that the jury should or
should not so find, but told the jury that it could not so find
the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent unless it found
that one or more of the matters stated in the subparagraphs
were true.
Yvith respect to plaintiff's argument on subparagraph
(a), we are very much surprised at plaintiff's insistence
that the jury must believe a certain matter to be true because plaintiff's witness so testified even though other
witnesses may have testified to the contrary. Appellant
states that the "evidence clearly showed * ~ * that the
employee did not turn his light in the direction from which
plaintiff was approaching until after plaintiff had applied
his brakes." Appellant forgets that defendant's witness
Belnap is entitled to be considered by the jury and that such
witness testified that he never even saw Mrs. Archibald approach because he was focusing his attention on the plain. .
tiff, but nevertheless was swinging his lantern in a horizontal position so that it could be seen from each direction,
and as the plaintiff approached closer he even ran in plaintiff's direction. Again we repeat the jury was entitled to
believe the witness Belnap, and if the jury did believe the
witness Belnap then they were entitled to find exactly as
was stated in subparagraph (a).
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With respect to subparagraphs (d) ani (e), appellant
complains that the jury may have found that plaintiff was
exceeding the speed limit and appellant states: "Yet the
evidence in the record shows that he was driving between
4'5 and 50 miles per hour, a legal rate of speed." Again we

must inform appellJant that he cannot ignore evidenc·e that
is not fav'orable to him. The plaintiff's own witness, Mr.
Carter, by his testimony gave sufficient basis for the jury
to find that the plaintiff was going at least 51 miles an hour
-even if he was going only 30 miles an hour at the point of
impact and not 40 as testified to by Mrs. Archibald. The
witness Turley, who observed the approacli of plaintiff's
car with a broadside view, testified that plaintiff was going
60 miles an hour. AGAIN WE MUST R.E,MIND PLAINTIF'F T'HE JURY WAS ENTITLED TO BE.LIEVE THE
WIT'NE:SS TUR.LEY, AND IF T'HE JURY DID 80, THERE
IS NO' REASON WHY THIS ~COURT ·S:H·OULD OVERRU,LE THEM IN T'HE MATTER.
With respect to subparagraph (g), plaintiff contends
that such paragraph assumes that the trait! was plainly
visible to plaintiff. Subparagraph (g) does not so assume,
but there was evidence in the record as shown by the mathematical calculations given earlier in this brief, from which
the jury could believe that the train was plainly visible to
the plaintiff for a sufficient time that he could have stopped,
and the jury was entitled to find that as a fact, and in in·,
struction No. 18 they were told, if you find that such was
a fact then plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
Appellant says. subparagraph (h) assumes that because
the plaintiff did not expect the train to be on the track that
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for that reason he failed to keep a proper lookout. Subparagraph (h) does not so assume, but the evidence shows that
plaintiff's guest saw the train both in the field and on the
highway before plaintiff did. It shows from plaintiff's own
testimony that the freight car was more than half way on
plaintiff's side of the pavement before plaintiff saw it, and
it also shows that plaintiff had at least sometime during
the progress toward the track been looking in his rear view
mirror watching the approaching officer. From this evidence the jury was entitled to find, if they so believed, that
the plaintiff was not keeping a proper lookout ahead. He
knew of the presence and location of the railroad track. The
fact that he did not expect the train to be there-taken into
consideration with his looking into the rear view mirror,
and other circumstances-formed a sufficient basis to allow
the jury to find that he was not keeping a proper lookout
ahead. As we stated hereinabove under the discussion with
respect to plaintiff's assignments Nos. 3 and 4, the defendant is entitled to have its theory of the case submitted to
the jury, and where there is evidence in the record, the jury
is entitled to be instructed with respect to such evidence if
they find such evidence to be true.
The jury was not in any manner instructed that they
should find that any one of the subparagraphs (a) to (h)
was true, but there was sufficient evidence which, if the
jury chose to believe it, t4ey could have believed that any
one or all of such conditions were true, and as a preface to
the entire instruction No. 18, instead of directing the jury
to so find, the court said, IF YOU FIND that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent, then you must find that it was
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because one or more of the following matters, which were
amply covered by testimony in the record, were true.
Defendant submits that the court did not err in giving
instruction No. 18.
APP'ELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OIF ERROR NO. 6
C,QNCERNING COURT'S REFUSAL T,O GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.

In Instruction No. 1 as requested by plaintiff, the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury that if they found
from the evidence that the defendant failed to exercise
proper care "either in maintaining a lookout for approaching traffic or in a failure, if any, to give any signal or warning of the presence or approach of the train of cars attached ,
to its said locomotive," then such failure would be negligence.
Respondent questions very much the propriety of giving
an instruction which would have allowed the jury to find
that the defendant failed "to give any signal" because
such evidence as there is in the record in any way favorable
to plaintiff concerning signals is only negative evidence,
whereas the members of the train crew are very positive
that a whistle was blown prior to the starting of the train
across the highway, and the engine bell was rung contin·
uously. Disregarding this question of failure to give a sig·
nal, however, the instruction would have allowed the jury
to find that the defendant was negligent for failing to exer·
cise care and caution "in maintaining a lookout for -approach·
ing traffic." The evidence in the record in this case did not
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in any manner justify an instruction to the jury upon which
they could have found that the defendant failed to exercise
proper care with respect to maintaining a lookout or that
would have authorized a jury to in any way find that the
defendant did fail to maintain a lookout for approaching
traffic.
A sin1ilar instruction was requested in the case of Van

Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. Co., .. Utah .. , 186· P. 2d 293,
and in that case the appellant assigned error because the
trial court refused to give the instruction. This court affirmed the trial court and with respect to such requested
instruction stated:
"The next assignment advanced by appellants
concerns the refusal of the trial court to instruct
the jury on respondent's alleged negligence arising
out of the train crew's failure to keep a proper lookout. If there is any substantial evidence in the record, the court should have submitted plaintiff's
theory to the jury, as this court, has held that there
is a duty upon the railroad company to keep a proper
lookout, particularly when approaching a public
crossing.
"There was no direct evidence that the train
crew was not keeping a proper lookout. On the contrary, the train crew testified to facts indicating a
reasonable compliance with this requirement. * * *"
The court then goes on to discuss some of the evidence
that may have had a bearing upon the question of lookout,
and then concludes:

"* * * Under the facts and circumstances
of this case, a failure to act in time to avoid a collision does not establish a failure to look."
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This court held in the Van Wagoner case that there
was not sufficient evidence to warrant the court's giving
instruction to the jury with respect to failure of the train
crew to keep a proper lookout, yet we submit that the evidence in that case was no stronger in favor of the defendant
upon the question of lookout than it is i~ the case at bar.
We think it is not necessary to cite any law upon the
proposition that if any portion of a requested instruction
is improper error cannot be assigned upon the refusal of the
court to give the instruction as requested.
'11

Respondent submits that with respect to the other matters contained in plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 1,
they were all substantially covered by other instructions
given by the court-in fact, in the opinion of respondent,
the court went too far in the giving of some instructions.
For instance, in Instruction No. 7 the court stated:
"It is a part of the duty of the operator of a
railroad locomotive to keep his train always under
reasonable control at crossings so as to avoid collision with other vehicles lawfully using the highway. He has no right to assume that the crossing
is clear, but under all circ-qmstances he must be vigilant and must anticipate and expect the presence of
others, as the use and exercise of ordinary care dictates."
The court then states that if defendant failed to use
such care it was negligent. That instruction overlooks the
fact that because of their difference in size and movement
the law requires an automobile to yield the prior right of
way to a train. That instruction would place upon the de-
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fendant the burden of avoiding collision with other vehicles
lawfully on the highway regardless of whether the operators of those vehicles were themselves exercising due care,
and respondent submits that the court went further than
was warranted either by the law or the' evidence in that
portion of Instruction No. 7.
Instruction No. 8 covered the question of whistle and
bell completely in spite of the fact that respondent feels that
a lack of whistle or bell under the circumstances in this case
could not have been the proximate cause of the accident.
The court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 7, and
again repeated it in No. 9, that the defendant was charged
with the responsibility of exercis.ing reasonable care, and
that if defendant failed to do so, such failure would be negligence. In Instruction No. 12 the court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff had a right to presume that the defendant
before crossing the highway would exercise reasonable care
for motor vehicles.
Defendant submits that the court did not err in refusing
to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 1.
Plaintiff contended throughout the trial, and seems to
be of the same opinion on this appeal, that defendant was
negligent because it had no light on its rear freight car. In
Instruction No. 1 as requested by plaintiff (the only requested instruction plaintiff complains about), he did- not
request the court to instruct the jury that defendant would
have been negligent if there was no light on the beet car,
it would have been error to give such an instruction had one
been requested. However, in spite of the lack of request and
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in spite of the fact that all of plaintiff's requested instructions were substantially covered if not directly given in the
court's instructions, plaintiff continues to argue here that
defendant was negligent for not having a light on the beet
car. Plaintiff's counsel argued to that effect before the
jury, and on page 22 of his brief cites an A. L. R. note which
seems to indicate that such car should have had a light on
it. The cases cited under the A. L. R. note do not support
such a statement except in one or two instances, and in most
if not all of such instances it vvill be found that there was
a statute or city ordinance which required such a light.
The quoted statement from 52 C. J. 213, Section 1811,
does not state the rule as requiring such lights but charges
negligence if such cars are backed over a crossing "without proper lookouts, or without proper lights, or other signals or warnings * * *". (Italics ours).
In the case at bar there was ample evidence from which
the jury could find not only proper lookout but other signals
and warnings-by both bell and whistle and by the flagman
on the crossing, whose lantern was s_een at least at some
stage of the occurrence by Mrs. Archibald, Mr. Squires and
the patrolman as well as most of the other members of the
train crew.
We acknowledge as good law the rule of the case of
Pokor·a v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292! U. S. 98, that the giving of
statutory signals may not exhaust the duty of the· railroad
company and that unusual conditions and circumstances
surr<?unding the crossing may require the railroad company,
in the exercise of due care, to do something in addition to
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the giving of statutory signals. What that something additional should be has not been definitely set by law and it is
left to the determination of the jury as to whether some
additional warning should have been given, and whether
what was done by the railroad company in attempting to give
that additional warning complied with the railroad's duty
in that respect if the jury should determine that the circumstances required such additional 'varning. Here the jury
could have found that Belnap supplied that additional warning and could have found that plaintiff would have seen such
warning if he had been driving at an appropriate speed with
his car under control with a proper lookout ahead.
One thing which appellant did not mention in connection with the case of Illinois Central R. Co. v. Davis, 3~2. F.
2d 23·2, cited on page 27 of his brief, was that there the
plaintiff contended the railroad company should have done
more even to comply with statutory provisions. The court
held that the questioned statute did not apply and reversed
the trial court's judgment for plaintiff saying:
"Under the law there should have been a directed verdict for defendant/'
In the case of Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Folkes, 18
S. E. 2d 309, cited on page 28 of appellant's brief, plaintiff
was a guest in the car and the question on appeal was
whether the negligence of the driver was a matter of law
the sole proximate cause of the accident, and the Virginia
court held that that was a question for the jury to decide.
In the California case of Peri v. Los Angeles Junction
Ry., 137 P. 2d 441, the plaintiffs were passengers and it was
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not in any way contended that they could be charged with
contributory negligence. The sole question was with respect
to the negligence of the defendant, or whether the negligence
of the driver was the sole proximate cause. Had the driver
in that case been the plaintiff the question would have been
different. In that case there was a wigwag which was. out
of order. The wigwag was known to the driver, and he testified directly that he relied on it. Also, in that case there
was fog limiting visibility to approxiraately lS feet, and
even a light could have been seen only 30 feet. Even then
the court said that considering the slow speeds involved
a whistle or bell could have avoided the accident.
In the case at bar there was no fog and no wigwag bell
to be relied on by the plaintiff, and in spite of appellant's
arguments to the contrary, there is ample evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that it was a bright
moonlight night, and in addition there was a flagman on
the crossing waving a lantern.
In the Peri case the California court did not say that
there should have been lights or flares but that under the
circumstances there existing, considering the fog and the
wigwag being out of order, the conditions required something in addition to the usual statutory signals, and it was
for the jury to determine what that something was. The
court stated:
I

"* * * It is only reasonable to say that the
necessity, nature, character and extent of the warnings such as flagmen, flares, lights and signals,
shifts with the circumstances of the particular case
and is a question of fact in each case."
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In a subsequent California case, Heintz v. Southern
Pacific, 147 P. 2d 621, wherein there was no question of fog
or other unusual conditions, the California court distinguished the Peri case and refused to follow it and sustained
a nonsuit against the drive~ of the automobile, who had been
killed in the accident.
See also a more recent case, Martindale v. Atchison., T.
& S. F. Ry. Co., 201 P. 2d 48, wherein the C'alifornia court
again distinguishes and refuses to follow the Peri case and
sustained judgments in favor of the defendant.
CONCLUSIO-N

Respondent earnestly contends that the trial court did
no_t commit error in any of the particulars charged by appellant and that under the Haarstrich case, as well as other
Utah cases which involved accidents similar to the case at
bar, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
B;RYAN P. LEVERIC'H,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
A. U. MINER,
Of Counsel.
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